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From green park to theme park? Evolving legacy visions for London’s Olympic Park
Introduction
The Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park (QEOP) opened to the public in 2013/4. In the preceding 
ten years the future of this two hundred and fifty hectare site in East London was subjected to 
intense debate, planning and envisioning. This paper analyses the evolving vision for the Park 
during this period. The analysis contributes to the literature on this significant case, but it also 
helps us to appreciate the challenges associated with event-led urban projects and the design 
and management of public parks in the 21st century. The paper is based on the author’s 
attendance at over thirty seminars, conferences and public events 2004-2014 at which 
officials and relevant professionals presented their work and ideas about the Parki. These 
presentations were analysed alongside the enormous amount of policies, plans and strategies 
(and accompanying media coverage) published to reveal the sort of place that was envisioned 
by the professionals hired to shape it. 
It is impossible to do justice to the complexities of the project in the space available here. So 
the paper concentrates on one key shift in emphasis – the move away from the original vision 
of large parklands and a blueprint for sustainable living towards a more bombastic, iconic 
landscape that is organised and promoted as a destination. This explains the transition from 
green park to theme park posited in the title of this paper. With reference to this shift, it is 
important to emphasise that the QEOP has never been envisaged as a traditional theme park. 
However, some characteristics that have emerged in recent years suggest there may be 
relevant parallels with theme park urbanism, a concept closely associated with Michael 
Sorkin following the publication in 1992 of his (edited) book entitled ‘Variations on a Theme 
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Park’. In the introduction to this text, Sorkin describes how urban designers now produce 
urban spaces characterised by ageographia, control and ‘simulations without end’. For 
Sorkin, ‘this is the meaning of the theme park’ii. 
The broad visions of those involved in planning the future of the Olympic Park are the focus 
here, so the paper constitutes an analysis of what, in Lefebvrian terms, should be considered 
‘representations of space’: the conceptualised spaces of plannersiii. The Park has only recently 
been fully open to the public. Consequently it is too early to examine how the space is being 
lived, reconfigured and reimagined by the people who use it. This is perhaps the most 
important dimension of space. However, the way spaces are lived depends partly on how they 
were conceived and this is the focus in this paper. One of the first accounts of experiencing 
the QEOP once it re-opened reported ‘the sense on the ground of a place being modelled 
from a plan you can’t quite fathom’iv.  This commentary highlights the interrelation of design 
intentions, conceptual models and lived experiences. 
Context
It is important to provide some context and an outline of the work undertaken to plan the 
long-term future of London’s Olympic Park: a process known as legacy planning. This will 
help explain why some changes disused here occurred, but it will also assist those unfamiliar 
with the London 2012 project to navigate the rest of the paper. Shifting visions for the Park 
2004-2014 were inevitable, not only because of the length of time under consideration, but 
also because of the project’s complexity and the underlying political and economic 
turbulence. Taking these factors into account one might have expected far greater drift. 
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The complexity of the project relates not only to the multiple interests involved, but also to 
the multiple stages: preparing a bid / delivering the Games / planning for the long-term. The 
Park was designed for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, but it was also made to be 
remade. In other words, the masterplanners had to configure a specialised events site, but also 
provide a framework for future development. At key points the long-term vision was 
formalised in masterplans and planning applications: 2003/2004 when candidature 
documentation and outline plans for the Olympic Park were produced; 2005-2007 when 
Masterplans and related planning applications were written; and 2008-2012 when the Legacy 
Masterplan / Legacy Communities Scheme and Supplementary Planning Guidance for the 
post-Games (re)development of the Park were prepared/approved. Alongside planning 
documents, key stakeholders published consultation documents, policy statements and public 
information that also communicated the legacy visionv. 
The institutional complexity involved is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the three 
institutions that produced plans during the period 2004-2012 no longer exist - the London 
Development Agency (LDA), Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) and Olympic Park Legacy 
Company (OPLC). The LDA co-ordinated land assembly and legacy planning in the early 
stages of the project (2004-8); with legacy planning assumed by a new Legacy Company 
established in 2009 (the OPLCvi). In 2012, responsibility for the Olympic Park and its fringes 
passed to a new agency accountable to the Mayor of London: the London Legacy 
Development Corporation (LLDC). These institutional changes were linked to wider political 
changes: changes of administration at the city and national levels in 2008 and 2010 
respectively. Other contextual changes were also significant; perhaps most importantly the 
global financial crisis. These factors caused a drift away from some of the original 
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aspirations. The discussion below assesses whether visions of a large, sustainable park were 
retained, before analysing the emergence of new priorities: tourism and revenue generation.
Green park 
In the initial, hypothetical, period of planning for London’s Olympic Park (2003-4), the 
purposes of the envisioning were clear; the project needed to impress the International 
Olympic Committee and bring a sceptical press and parliament onside. The difficulties 
delivering a new national stadium and the aborted attempt to host the 2007 World Athletics 
Championships had seemingly proven the UK’s inability to deliver mega-projects. In this 
climate, one way to justify public expenditure was to promise a park. Parks are rare assets in 
urban planning; although they can be expensive to maintain, there is universal consensus that 
they are good thing. In the ‘Vision for the Olympic and Paralympic Games’, published to 
justify a London Games centred in the Lower Lea Valley, the bid team promised that:
‘at its heart would be the new 500 acre Olympic Park containing the major sporting 
facilities and set in 1500 acres stretching from Hackney Marshes down to the Thames. 
It would be one of the largest new parks seen in Europe for 200 years’vii. 
Although the legacy vision to deliver a new park has never been reneged upon, there has been 
a subtle downscaling of the original ambitions. Parklands south of the Olympic Park 
connecting it to the Thames have not been realised yet due to several factors, not least the 
financial crisis. The 2004 London Plan, the Spatial Development Strategy into which the 
Olympic bid was integrated, had proposed a linear park in the Lea Valley. Indeed, the 
wording in the vision cited above is taken from the 2004 London Plan and the Olympic 
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Games were initially justified as way to accelerate the linear park project. However, once the 
Olympic bid was won, there was a conscious refocusing on a more tightly defined area in and 
around the Olympic Park at the expense of other sites governed by the London Thames 
Gateway Development Corporation (West Ham, Canning Town and Barking Riverside). 
More focus was welcomed by many involved in urban regeneration who felt the Thames 
Gateway plans for East London were too ambitious, particularly in an austerity era. This all 
highlights how the Olympic Park became a project in its own right rather than merely one 
part of a wider East London regeneration. The new parklands are currently confined to a 
limited stretch of the Lower Lea Valley. 
Another aspect of the (c.2004) London 2012 vision cited above, the idea that the Olympic 
Park ‘would be one of the largest new parks seen in Europe for 200 years’, is also worth 
scrutinising. During the period 2004-2012 various iterations of this statement were 
disseminated to help justify the Olympic project, with the general trend being to downscale 
the original promise. By 2007 official documents were promising ‘one of the largest new 
urban parks in Europe for 150 years’viii. In 2012 the Government were merely promising the 
‘biggest urban park for a century’ix. To assess whether the parklands dimension has actually 
diminished is a challenging task. Measuring the size of parklands or open space is technically 
difficult as definitions are vague. According to the 2007 planning approval, the authorities are 
obliged to provide 102 hectares of open space. This still applies, although there are some 
concerns that plans for housing and other developments might erode this provision. For 
example, the Olympic Legacy Supplementary Planning Guidance highlights the potential 
impacts of new housing on the ‘overall quantity and quality of new public space and 
metropolitan open land required by the 2007 Olympic planning approval’x.
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Even though promises to deliver the 102 ha of open space are currently being honoured, it is 
also important to take into account subjective perceptions. Much of the open space in the 
Olympic Park is characterised by hard surfaces - ideal for staging events but not necessarily 
the grassy park people were expecting or were promised. In 2008 new designs were released 
that showed how ‘the Olympic Park will become a Hyde Park for East London’xi. This type 
of rhetoric seemed to communicate that the Olympic Park would be typical of London’s 
Royal Parks. This was later reaffirmed by naming the new park the Queen Elizabeth Olympic 
Park. However, the QEOP is unlike a traditional parkxii. The linear shape and multiple levels 
of this waterside site also make the green / open space seem limited. Current plans are 
certainly less ‘green’ than designs proposed in 2008 which included a cricket pitch, orchards, 
allotments, an events lawn, a city farm and a One Planet ecology pavilion. 
The idea that the Olympic Park was ultimately about new parklands was challenged by a 
creeping urbanism in visions for the Olympic Park. Evidence of this shift appeared soon after 
the bid was won. The British Property Federation released a report stating that ‘it is extremely 
welcome that the Masterplan for the main Olympic site involves raising the density 
significantly to give it a proper urban character’xiii. And in 2007 the ODA confirmed that ‘the 
vision for Games legacy is … to create a vibrant new part of London that exhibits the best of 
urban design, civic spaces and architecture’xiv. This new emphasis on an urban park was 
perhaps most obvious in the ODA’s new rhetoric that they were building ‘a piece of city’ - 
rather than building Europe’s biggest park for 200/150/100 years. Representatives from 
surrounding Boroughs recommended that the Park should be developed as an urban centre 
rather than as a recreational area serving existing centres. This was linked to the idea that the 
Park should not be a liminal place but an integrated one that felt like a part of East London, or 
London in general. 
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Envisioning the Park as an urban setting was furthered in the OPLC-led vision of generously 
proportioned family housing. Previously, the vision was for multi-storey apartments 
surrounding a generously proportioned park - in a manner similar to New York’s Central 
Park. The OPLC’s idea was to provide housing that was both more family oriented and more 
like London’s traditional homes: low rise housing; and crescents organised like London’s 
great estates. Accordingly, the 2012 Legacy Communities Scheme included proposals for 
terraced housing east of the media centres. The obvious problem with this approach is that 
low rise family oriented units require more space. The LLDC are committed to minimum 
open space stipulations but the Park will be getting smaller over time as housing 
developments commence. This is not widely appreciated so the new developments may be 
viewed negatively by park users. This problem has occurred before in UK event projects; for 
example the National Garden Festival regeneration projects of the 1980s. These Garden 
Festivals were not meant to create parks – but this was not always understood by the public, 
causing controversy when festival sites were redeveloped for housingxv.
In the bid documents submitted to the IOC, London’s bid team promised that ‘the 
development of the Olympic Park will transform 200 hectares of degraded land into a 
magnificent new legacy park’xvi. Significantly, the bid committee were not just promising a 
new park; they were promising to replace degraded land with a new park. This type of 
rhetoric continued to appear throughout the next decade, and exemplifies a typical 
‘motivational frame’xvii for urban development. Urban regeneration projects are often framed 
by the denigration of the site in order to justify large scale change. Hence during the planning 
and visioning of the Olympic Park, the site was dismissed as a wasteland or a void that 
needed to be filled. Many of the officials tasked with making the Olympic Park used similar 
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rhetoric and imagery to justify their project. In many presentations, officials showed a before 
and after A-Z map with the site represented as a blank space on one side of the slide and as an 
Olympic Park on the other. Such practice is the not only the epitome of framing, but the 
perfect illustration of the power of representations of space. The circa 2005 A-Z map was 
presented as the reality that needed to be fixed, rather than merely a cartographic depiction. 
Other parts of the framing were equally spurious; the dismissal of the site by officials as a 
dumping ground for refrigerators when in fact this was merely one small part. 
The framing of the project as a way of replacing toxic wastelands is particularly relevant here 
because it inherently dismissed the recreational land and open space that was available on the 
site before it became an Olympic Park.  The ODA planning application in 2007 revealed that 
there were 92.8ha of open space prior to the Olympic project, a figure only just below the 
102ha promised in the new Olympic Park.  This inconvenient truth was recognised by MPs in 
2003 - prior to government commitment to the project - when the site was described as ‘not 
just derelict land needing restoration, but rather a precious and tranquil green lung’xviii. 
Ultimately, ten years of legacy planning delivered formalised, institutionalised recreational 
space in the north of the park, instead of the loose, vague recreational space that existed 
before…..
Green park 2: a sustainable park?
The idea of a green park not only means parklands, it means a park that is environmentally 
sustainable. This notion was also prominent in early visions for the Olympic Park: from 2007 
one of the key aims of the London 2012 project was to make the Olympic Park ‘a blueprint 
for sustainable living’xix. The idea of building prototypes for environmentally friendly or 
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socially progressive urbanism is a common feature of mega-event projects, particularly 
World Expos. During the period 2007-2011 many good examples of sustainable design and 
sustainable management were implemented in the Parkxx. However, over time, sustainability 
became less prominent in legacy visionsxxi. This was perhaps most obviously illustrated in the 
Government’s document ‘Beyond 2012’, in which the notion of the Olympic Park being a 
blueprint for sustainable living, was replaced with the idea of the Park as ‘a blueprint for 
modern living’xxii. 
Making the Park a model of sustainability has been hampered by a series of missed 
opportunities. The large wind turbine that was planned for the north of the park was 
jettisoned; primarily because of cost issues. Other potentially iconic symbols of sustainability 
- e.g. the energy centres - are now overshadowed by the more contrived symbols such as The 
Orbit viewing tower. There was an ideal opportunity to showcase sustainable design 
principles during the Olympic Games, but a long planned exhibition was accessible only to 
those with ‘backstage’ accreditation and attracted a mere 2,000 visitorsxxiii. Hosting green 
technology businesses in the Park was also discussed. The failure of this to be realised or 
formally incorporated into plans helped fuel criticism that legacy planners were too 
concerned about job creation, at the expense of consideration about the types of employment 
that might be most beneficial. 
Parks and environmental sustainability share some important characteristics: both have very 
positive meanings and both are conveniently vague concepts. This made them extremely 
useful in helping to justify staging the Olympic Games in the early envisioning of the project. 
Officials have attempted to honour ambitious promises of new, sustainable parklands. 
However, in later visions these ambitions were de-emphasised and obscured by aspirations 
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that were hard to square with mundane recreational / sustainability objectives: the rise of 
tourism considerations and ‘destination making’. 
Destination making and theme park urbanism
From the outset, the Olympic Park was imagined as a place that would provide jobs and 
housing, plus much needed educational and transport improvements. These ambitions were 
largely retained 2004-2014, with recent evidence suggesting many may be realised. This is a 
considerable achievement, particularly given the complexity of the project. However, during 
the course of the project, other objectives appeared too. One of the emerging considerations 
was the need for the Park to be developed as a destination able to attract domestic and 
international visitors. The idea of the Olympic Park as a destination gathered pace after the 
election of Boris Johnson as Mayor of London (2008) and the establishment of the OPLC 
(2009). Rather than merely providing local amenities, the Park would be a ‘global visitor 
attraction’ that would attract 9.3 million visitors a year from 2016xxiv. This was entirely 
consistent with a shift away from an East London agenda, to ‘a greater emphasis on the 
London-wide and global orientation’xxv. It also fits Silk’s observation that ‘competitive city 
reimaging for the external tourist market has been central in the build-up to the Games’xxvi. 
The new destination emphasis was materialised in the plans for and construction of the 
Arcelor Mittal Orbit [hereafter The Orbit] - a sculpture introduced in 2010 that contradicted 
many of the design principles of the Park. In the initial years of Olympic Park planning 
(2004-7), the 2008 Beijing Games were at the top of people’s minds and London officials 
were keen to avoid competing with the Chinese capital’s grand structures. London’s response 
was to adopt the opposite approach: a lighter touch, sustainable Olympic precinct displaying 
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‘straightforward common sense and legacy planning’xxvii. This was exemplified by the 
designs for the Velodrome and Olympic Stadium. The Orbit marked the official end of this 
sensible approach and its bombastic design sat awkwardly with the post-2008 period of 
austerity; making it seem outdated even before the structure was finished. 
There are multiple explanations for the decision to build The Orbit, but ultimately it was part 
of a plan instigated by the new Mayor to drive footfall in the Park and to give the site a 
stronger image as a destination. Its appearance has been the subject of much comment and 
much criticism, with one high profile verdict denigrating both its appearance and its inherent 
unsustainability: ‘[it] looks like the result of a competition to see who could piss the most 
steel into the air’xxviii.  In presentations given by OPLC officials, crass comparisons were 
made with the Eiffel Tower: a structure also built as part as part of a mega-event (the 1889 
Exposition Universelle). These parallels were made to legitimise and monumentalise the 
controversial sculpture. However, structures develop iconicity over time; and there is a 
chequered record of those deliberately built to serve as destination / event iconsxxix. 
Inevitably, Anish Kapoor, one of the artists responsible for The Orbit’s design, has tried to 
distance himself from the idea that this was an attempt to impose an icon: ‘we didn’t want an 
icon, we wanted a moving narrative’xxx. Its justification as a piece of artwork is undermined 
by paid for entry, which not only limits interaction with the workxxxi, it has meant the 
installation of ‘a harsh fence and lumpy support buildings which do nothing to help the park 
feel like a park’xxxii.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
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The Orbit was not merely built as a sculpture, but as a viewing platform and visitor attraction
xxxiii; something that further cements the Park’s new envisaged role as a tourist destination. 
Theme park urbanism, subtly evident elsewhere, is manifested here in a more obvious 
manner - particularly as The Orbit looks like a ‘scrunched-up rollercoaster’xxxiv or a helter-
skelter [see Figure 1]. Interestingly, in recent visions for the QEOP, some of the Olympic 
venues have also been recast as ‘must-see’ attractions. Publicity materials produced by the 
LLDC are replete with tourism tropes; the indoor sport venues (Velodrome, Aquatics Centre, 
Copper Box), are promoted alongside The Orbit and Stadium as the ‘big five’ attractions.  
This is just one part of the LLDC’s impressive promotional work; their branding of the 
QEOP is very strong. Even their public facing website domain name ‘noordinarypark.co.uk’ 
highlights the way they are trying to communicate that the Park is more than a set of local 
amenities; and therefore worth visiting. What is being created is a ‘brandscape’xxxv; a heavily 
marketed and highly controlled environment where consumers are immersed and seduced. 
The revised design of the Park, particularly the introduction of The Orbit, assists 
brandscaping by making it more easily reducible to simple imagery. The product being sold 
is ‘big sport’; not informal recreation or outdoor activity, but big events plus sport you have 
to pay for at the VeloPark (‘feel the thrill on two wheels’) or Aquatics Centre (‘swim in the 
pool of champions’)xxxvi. 
A new tourist oriented landscape is being created in more subtle ways too. Tourism 
academics have noted the way that successful destinations tend to be highly ‘imageable’, not 
only allowing them to be conveniently branded, but more easily ‘consumed’ in person. 
According to Edensorxxxvii, touristscapes tend to frame environments from above or from a 
distance, so tourists can take possession of them. This tallies with the OPLC’s legacy 
masterplan that ‘seems to be about creating vistas and views across the park’xxxviii. Edensor 
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also feels that serial touristscapes are spaces saturated with imagery which is normally 
consumed before one enters the space. Hence visitation becomes a process of collecting 
signs, rather than a spontaneous experiencexxxix. This certainly resonates with the QEOP, 
where tourists are invited to rediscover the edifices they consumed whilst watching the 
Olympic Games on television. 
Touristscapes are usually the result of what planners / designers think tourists want, rather 
than something that tourists actually want. The Olympic Park fits this trend nicely; it is a 
landscape designed with the archetypal tourist in mind, even though tourists are increasingly 
hard to profile and despite the lack of evidence that tourists want anything different from 
other users of urban space. Indeed, one of the great urban tourism successes of recent years is 
New York’s High Line: which is the opposite of an iconic landscapexl. To emulate this 
success the LLDC recruited one of the designers responsible for the High Line to develop one 
‘Corner’ of the Olympic Park. This hasn’t necessarily alleviated the theme park feel. Moore 
feels the Park represents a ‘Disneyfied’ version of New York’s High Linexli.
It is not merely the appearance and marketing of attractions, and the landscape design, that 
marks the Olympic Park as a tourist destination: it is also the organisation and management 
of space. Sorkinxlii famously compared the design and management of contemporary cities to 
theme parks; citing the ageography, surveillance and simulated environment as shared 
characteristics. These definitely relate to the planned environments of the QEOP; which 
exhibit Sorkin’s dystopia of ‘generic urbanism’ and ‘grafted signification’ and which ‘allow 
people to circulate through threatening urban territory’xliii. The QEOP has been designed 
using the organisational structure of the theme park; the zoning of space, the high security 
and the disjointed eclecticism of the architecture. Post-Games planning for the Olympic Park 
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seems to be a good example of strategic re-territorialisationxliv. Space becomes territory 
through its organisation, but also through naming and installations. Accordingly, Park space 
has been organised into themed zones; with new installations - e.g. The Orbit - marking this 
as a monumental space for sight-seeing. Re-territorialisation as destination is assisted by 
giving the whole area a new name: E20 / QEOP. The space and the way it has been marketed 
is so reminiscent of a commercial theme park that posters advertising the reopening of the 
Park in 2014 had to emphasise that there was FREE ENTRY. As the main entrance / exit is 
through a new Westfield shopping mall, the ultimate stereotype in theme park design is also 
present: exit through the gift shop. 
The QEOP is not a theme park. However, the idea that it can be understood as a ‘variation on 
a theme park’ has merit. Various journalists and critics have also drawn similar parallels. 
When the ODA completed their work on the Park, Paul Hayward wrote that ‘the country 
finds itself constructing a sporting Disneyland’xlv, whilst Iain Sinclair described the Park as ‘a 
theme park without a theme’xlvi. In a related metaphor, others have described plans for the 
space as ‘la-la land, a fantasy world, the kingdom of the birds’xlvii.  The ‘other-wordly-ness’ 
of the spaces is perhaps an inevitable function of the huge levels of resources devoted to the 
project. In some instances mega-event sites have not been planned enough, but others have 
been subjected to too many competing plansxlviii. Officials in London, paranoid about 
reproducing the redundant Olympic landscapes in Athens, have layered plan on plan and 
devoted huge sums of money to redevelop spaces. Monclus identifies the dangers of this kind 
of ‘investment overdose’ in mega-event projects: something he defines as; ‘the excessive 
concentration of resources in a limited space with the physical risk of the formation of 
enclaves or precincts poorly integrated to the urban structure or at the danger of an excessive 
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standardisation, theming or banalisation of the project spaces’xlix. The QEOP is the latest 
example: too much planning and excessive resources - resulting in a contrived space. 
In late 2013 The Mayor of London revealed his latest plans for the Park: Olympicopolis. In 
doing so he reaffirmed the shift towards destination making outlined above. New museums - 
satellite ‘branches’ of established brands - are now planned for part of the Park, to provide 
cultural attractions and an educational dimension that some felt was missing. One of the main 
influences on this vision seems to be the legacies of previous events in London. The 
Southbank and South Kensington were both developed in association with major events (the 
Festival of Britain and the Great Exhibition) and the latest plans attempt to provide an eastern 
equivalent. According to a former Director at the LLDC, this new direction was the result of 
pressure from local Boroughs for more ‘wow factor’ in the Parkl. Their belief is that only a 
spectacular place will allow the Park to drive the re-imaging, revitalisation and 
redevelopment of East London more widely. The Orbit, Westfield and grandiose sport stadia 
are seemingly not enough, an even more ‘iconic’ landscape is required. 
Olimpicoplis highlights the way visions, plans and long-term intentions are superseded by 
unexpected opportunities and emergent strategies. This is how mega-event landscapes from 
Seville to Sydney have evolved - not by realising long-term plans, but through opportunistic 
development and unexpected colonisationsli. Trying too hard to ensure that a place is used 
may actually be counter-productive: recent urban design ideas emphasise the importance of 
space which invites different uses and users rather than imposing a fixed idea of what and 
who space is forlii. This flexible approach challenges the whole notion of legacy planning - a 
discourse that dominated the visions for London’s Olympic Park 2004-2104. Legacies cannot 
be imposed on spaces; they emerge. 
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Competing visions?
The analysis above highlights how visions evolved over time, but it should also be noted that 
there were multiple visions being communicated at once, with some contradictions evident. 
For example, the new emphasis on creating a spectacular destination co-exists with the notion 
that the Park should reflect east London / London more widely. These ideas seem hard to 
reconcile. The OPLC and now the LLDC have been adamant that the site should merge into 
its periphery, yet the rhetoric of building a new piece of city - and the allocation of a new 
postcode - suggests it has always been the intention to build something new and distinct, 
rather than an extension of the existing urban environment. This distinction suits (risk averse) 
property developers too. The destination emphasis is also incongruent: theme park urbanism 
is the epitome of segregated space. There are also contradictions in the spatial dimensions of 
the visions. The Mayor of London wants to avoid high rise housing, yet the low rise urbanism 
he advocates eats into the land available for cultural attractions and recreational space and 
normalises his spectacular destination. 
The distinct zoning of space is the way that these conflicting visions may be reconciled. 
Officials involved argue that the QEOP is big and diverse enough to satisfy different visions 
simultaneously. The North Park has been promoted as a calmer, more locally oriented place 
with the South Park earmarked as the events / destination zone. Following this logic, rather 
than dismissing the QEOP as a theme park, it might be better understood as an international 
destination with an adjoining local park. 
Explanations and implications
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An enormous amount of time and resources have been expended over the past ten years to 
plan the future of London’s Olympic Park. The sheer volume of documents, strategies and 
plans produced has been remarkable. Ambitious objectives were set, and the project has made 
a significant contribution to the provision of local housing, employment and transport 
facilities. The main objective here was not to judge the outcomes of these efforts, but to 
identify ways that legacy plans for the Olympic Park have shifted. Although there is an 
obvious danger of over-simplification, it seems the notion of sustainable parklands, whilst 
still present, has been overtaken by a vision for a more bombastic and a more urbanised 
setting: one ‘crammed with spectacular attractions and activities’ as the Mayor of London 
puts itliii. The shift in emphasis is neatly symbolised by the revised vertical dimension of the 
Park; with plans for a 130 metre wind turbine replaced by a 115 metre viewing tower. This 
new approach overshadows the potential iconicity of some of the Park’s exemplars of 
sustainability, such as the energy centres. The impressive design of these structures convinces 
Hartmanliv that they will act as beacons of sustainable development. But The Orbit and other 
public sculptures - plus the decision to retain a large stadium on site - means they are 
increasingly obscured. 
It is possible to explain why these changes have occurred via reference to some obvious 
truths. All mega-projects evolve and this one is no different. Urban mega-projects usually 
span several electoral cycles; and when political leadership changes so do projects, 
particularly if they are linked to something as politically significant as the Olympic Games. 
In the case analysed here, there was also drift because of shifting institutional responsibility 
for legacy planninglv. With hindsight, there may have been a more consistent and more 
coherent (albeit less pluralistic) vision had the ODA overseen both initial masterplanning and 
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subsequent legacy planning. However, the discussion here also highlights that mega-projects 
are not merely delivered by one organisation; a large number of institutional stakeholders are 
involved. In London this meant constant pressure (e.g from Host Boroughs) to envision the 
Park in a manner that suited diverse interests. As Yaneva and Heaphylvi have argued in this 
journal with reference to the Olympic Stadium, high profile projects may begin as a technical 
and aesthetic objects, but they inevitably turn into inherently social designs ‘the building 
becomes a multiple object; an assembly of contested issues: community development, 
sustainability, legacy and cost’lvii. This is even more relevant when one considers the 
Olympic Park as a whole, rather than merely its principal structures. Protracted and 
inconsistent legacy planning 2004-14 may be regarded by some as inefficient, but it provides 
evidence of negotiated representations of space.
Visions for mega-projects are not simply plans to configure space, they are produced at 
different times, for a variety of reasons and for diverse audiences. The original plans for the 
Olympic Park were designed to impress the IOC and to bring a sceptical public onside. 
Sustainable credentials helped to impress the former, and even hardened sceptics found it 
hard to oppose the construction of a public park on land branded useless and toxic. This was 
vision as justification (for the event) - one might say visionary justification - something 
required at the early stages of mega-event projects (particularly given their poor track record). 
The idea that mega-events are catalysts for regeneration is widely accepted, but in reality 
regeneration projects are often used tactically by event hosts to help justify their 
extravagance. Following this logic, mega-events may benefit more from their coupling with 
regeneration projects than regeneration projects benefit from mega-events. 
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Despite acknowledgment of the need for long-term planning, during the mid-stages of the 
project officials were understandably distracted by the need to deliver a successful event. 
This emphasises a key problem with event-led projects; even though long-term objectives are 
used to justify them, the event inevitably becomes the central concern. Legacy plans then 
have to be retrofitted over a landscape which is already configured. In London, as the post-
Games period approached, so did the reality of developing and managing a large site. At this 
stage, plans were made to address the original objectives but also to impress investors - to 
fund the development of the Park and to pay back the money borrowed to purchase, 
remediate and redevelop land. In a culture of cost-saving and income generation, 
sustainability initiatives and social legacy projects tend to be neglected. This highlights a 
further key problem with mega-event projects; financial pressures caused by spending on the 
event mean that post-event plans for sustainable development are compromised in the rush to 
claw back money. 
Parks are valuable social amenities, but they are also development assets and so any further 
reductions in parklands to provide housing are misguided financially, as well as for more 
altruistic reasons. As the ODA recognised in their original design principles for the Park ‘the 
lush green setting will also help to drive land value and investor interest in development 
sites’lviii. This highlights how the production and design of public leisure space is now driven 
by the need to support economic outcomeslix. Hence new parks are developed in conjunction 
with hospitality, retail and housing provision, rather than as entities in their own right. The 
QEOP is a good example of this trend: ultimately, the parklands make the surrounding 
commercial and property developments viable. The new emphasis on this dimension, and its 
contrast with earlier visions, is entirely predictable. Mega-event projects are often justified 
initially by the provision of social assets with ‘commercially exploitable phases and 
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precincts’ introduced later.lx As Evanslxi notes; each story of regeneration begins with poetry 
and ends with real estate.
The LLDC are under pressure to generate regular income, as well as capital returns. There is 
currently a budget shortfall and according to the Greater London Authority ‘the ability of the 
LLDC to generate income depends heavily on attracting large numbers of visitors to the 
QEOPlxii. This explains the new emphasis on tourism and the intense brandscaping noted in 
this paper. In this sense, the QEOP is a good illustration of the difficulties faced by park 
designers and managers in the 21st century. In London, public funding for parks is being 
reduced significantly, with parks expected to make up the shortfall via commercial revenues. 
The new reality of park management is best illustrated in the recent Nesta publication 
‘Rethinking Parks’lxiii where recommendations are dominated by one theme: how to 
maximise income generationlxiv. In this context, and in light of difficulties making previous 
Olympic sites sustainable financially, it is perhaps unsurprising that commercially oriented 
visions for the Olympic Park have gained prominence.
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